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Summary findings
Drawing on Northern  European experience - where  quickly, but tends to preserve the cultures and identities
three Scandinavian countries Iaave  practiced integrated  of the predecessor agencies more than is oytimal.
supervision for the past 10 years - Taylor and Fleming  Whatever the structure,  integrated supervisioon  requires
address three policy-related issues associated with the  active management to secure the potential benefits that
integrated model:  the approach offers.
* Under what conditions should (or should not) a  * How should the integration  process be
country consider moving toward an integrated model of  implemented?
financial supervision?  While the decision to move to an integratecd  agency
Clearly, for a small transition or developing econormy,  must be carefully thought through in the context of the
or an economy with a small financial sector, the  country concerned, the more difficult part is
economies of scale from establishing an integrated  implementation,  which must be sensitively  anonaged.
agency outweigh the costs of mnoving  to such a model. A  Once the decision has been made, implementation
strong case can also be made for an integrated approach  should take place as quickly as possible. A vwell-conceived
in a financial sector dominated by banks, with little role  "change management" process should aim t-  overcome
for capital markets or a highly integrated financial sector.  the cultural barriers associated with the previous
* How  shoulcl an integrated agency be structured,  fragmented structure.
organized, and managed?  Taylor and Fleming's review of Northern  European
There is no single obviously correct organizational  experience with integration of financial supervision raises
structure,  and existing agencies are experimenting with a  a range of questions relevant to developing and
variety of forms. An institutionally based structure has  transition economies, which they discuss.
the virtue of simplicity and can be implemented fairly
This paper - a product of the IPrivate  and Financial Sectors Development Unit, Europe and Central Asia Rejion  - is pa:t
of a larger effort in the region to assist transition economies in strengthening the legal and regulatory frame';7ork for the r
financial sectors. Copies of the paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washingtoii, :DC  20433;.
Please  contact  Sylvia  Torres,  room  H6-326,  telephone  202-473-9012,  fax  202-522-0005,  Interne t  addrems
storres@worldbank.org.  Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at www.worldbank org/research/
workingpapers. The authors  may be contacted  at nirtaylor@imf.org or afleming@worldbank.org. Noveml er 1999.  (3  5
pages)
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I.  INTRODUCTION
Background
1.1  There  has recently  been a groundswell  of interest around  the world in the organization  of
the structure  of financial  supervision. Whereas in the past financial supervision  tended to be
organized  around  specialist  agencies  for the banking,  securities,  and insurance  sectors, in the last
few  years a  number of  industrialized countries have moved to  integrate these  different
supervisory  functions  in a single agency. Indeed  an informal  club of "integrated  supervisors"-
comprising  representatives  from Australia,  Canada,  Denmark,  Japan,  Korea, Norway,  Singapore,
Sweden and the UK-met  in Sydney, Australia in early May 1999 for the first time.  They
discussed  issues of mutual interest arising  from the application  of the integrated  model.  In this
paper these integrated agencies will be referred to generically as integrated financial sector
supervisory  agencies  (IFSSAs).
1.2  Beyond  the industrialized  countries,  some countries  that have relatively  recently  set up a
supervisory  framework,  such as the transition  countries  of Europe  and Central  Asia (ECA),  have
been examining  the case for introducing  an IFSSA. Latvia and Estonia are examples of these
countries. Bulgaria is also reportedly contemplating  such a move.  Beyond the ECA region,
Korea (already  in the informal  club noted above)  and Thailand-both  developing  countries  that
have suffered severe financial crises recently-are  moving towards an integrated regulator
model.
1.3  The move to an integrated model is perceived in some quarters as a relatively recent
phenomenon,  perhaps because the  sudden decision to  establish the  UK Financial Services
Authority  (FSA) received so much attention  in the financial  press.  But it is not perhaps fully
appreciated that three of the Scandinavian  countries (Denmark, Norway, and Sweden) had
adopted  variants  of the integrated  supervisor  model since  the mid-1  980s. Finland  has undertaken
reform  in this area but has not moved  to a fully integrated  model. It is pertinent  to ask therefore
what lessons  can be drawn from their several years of experience  with an integrated approach.
While the UK FSA experience  is too recent  to yield lessons  in the organizational  and operational
spheres, it too can shed light on the actual process of integration.  Hence, taken together,
Northern European experience can potentially provide a rich source of guidance for those
countries  contemplating  a move  to the integrated  model.
1.4  Accordingly  this paper-drawing on Northern  European  experience-has been written  to
assist transition  and developing  countries  address  three policy-related  issues:*  Under what conditions should, or should not, a country consider moving to an  ntegrated
model of financial supervision?
*  How should an integrated agency be structured, organized, and managed?
*  How should the integration process itself be implemented?
1.5  In order to address these issues the paper is structured in five sections.  In the remainder
of Section I the evolution of the debate on integration is discussed.  In Section II a review of
Northem European experience is undertaken with reference to some key themes that go to the
heart of the integration debate.  These themes include the question of governance, the structure
and organization of integrated agencies,  their regulatory  powers and responsibilities,  and the
arrangements for crisis management.  The question of how the integration of the  constituent
agencies can be implemented effectively is broached in Section III.  Section IV seeks to draw out
the implications of Northern European experience for the transition and developing economies.
Finally, Section V sets out  the main conclusions and  identifies  areas where  further research
would be warranted in this fast developing area of interest.
The evolution of the debate
1.6  An active debate on the pros and cons of the integrated model of supervision began only
very  recently.  The  decisions  to  completely  integrate  the  supervisory  agencies  in  the
Scandinavian countries took place as part of an evolutionary process.  The final steps towards
full integration in the early 1990s were discussed in the Scandinavian press and debated in the
respective ministries bul.  did not, for the most part, lead to a significant academic debate.
1.7  An intense debate took place as part of the deliberations on the organizational stv-ucture  of
regulation in Australia undertaken by the Wallis Committee (1996).  In this context Au tralia has
subsequently moved to  a  type of "twin  peaks"  structure (Taylor,  1995), where  regulation  is
broken  down between  agencies  specializing  on prudential  supervision  on  the  one  liand and
conduct of business regulation on the other.  A similar debate has taken place in Somitk.  Africa
although no move towards integration has subsequently taken place.
1.8  Perhaps the most intense debate-both  in the financial press and in academic circles-
has taken place in the UK immediately in advance of, and subsequent to the establishmin.t of the
FSA.  This intensity was related in part to the fact that the Bank of England had estciblished a
substantial banking supervisory capacity and had  stressed, over many years, the need  to keep
monetary policy making and banking supervision in the same body.  This, it was argued, enabled
the sharing of market intelligence and led to some important synergies.  Much stress u as put on
the argument that monetary and  financial stability are inter-related.  Hence those  in favor  of
An important  issue  in deciding  to adopt  a unified  supervisory  agency  is to consider  whether  it should  be concerned
exclusively  with  prudential  (ie. Safety  & soundness)  regulation,  or whether  it should also  have responsibi  I  ity for
conduct  of business  matters. This  debate  lies beyond  the scope  of this paper,  although  it should  be noted that  only
the United  Kingdom,  of the countries  surveyed,  has created  a unified  regulator  with both  prudential  and c  .nduct of
business  responsibilities.
2regulatory and  supervisory reform were  required to  put  forth a  very robust  case.  The main
academic contributors to the UK debate have been Goodhart (1996), Taylor  (1995,1996) and
Goodhart et al (1998).  The most recent rationale for the integrated regulator model can be found
in Briault's  paper (1999).  Outside the countries cited above there has been little serious debate
but this might be expected to take place in the coming years.2
1.9  But what have been the main factors stimulating this debate?  Goodhart et al (1998) have
identified six reasons for its recent emergence:
*  The rapid structural  change that  has taken place  in  financial markets  spurred by  the
acceleration in  financial innovation.  This  has challenged the assumptions  behind the
original structuring of regulatory organization.  The question that arises here is whether
institutional structure should mirror the evolution of the structure of the financial sector.
*  The realization that financial structure in the past has been the result of a series of ad hoc
and pragmatic policy initiatives raising the question of whether-particularly  in the wake
of recurrent banking crises and dislocation-a  more coherent structure should be put in
place.
*  The increasing  complexity  of  financial  business  as  evidenced by  the  emergence  of
fnancial  conglomerates.  This  has  raised  the  issue  of  whether  a  series  of  agencies
supervising parts of an institution can have a grasp of developments in the institution as a
whole.
*  The increasing demands being placed on regulation and its complexity, in particular the
development of a need for enhanced regulation of "conduct of business" (eg. covering
financial products like pension schemes and insurance offered to consumers).
*  The changing risk characteristics of financial firms occasioned by financial innovation.
*  The increasing internationalization of banking which has implications for the institutional
structure of agencies at both the national and international level.
Superimposed on these six factors are other country-specific factors that, as Northern European
experience will show, can be very significant.
2  There has been virtually no academic work undertaken on this topic in the USA or Germany where there are
several regulatory agencies and where the federal structure implies the regional delegation of supervision to some
extent.
3II.  THE NORTH[ERN EUROPEAN  EXPERIENCE
2.1  This section diistills  the  common features of the  Northern European experience by
considering  a number of broad themes. These include: the Northern European rationale  for ar
integrated  approach; the scope of regulatory  powers and responsibilities;  the mechanisms for
governance,  accountability,  and funding; the internal organizational  structure of the agencies,
and; crisis  management  arrangements. All of these issues are important  in their own right but ii:
is through examining  these in some detail that the subtlety of differences  between the models
adopted by the five countries  under consideration  here can be discerned.  Moreover some of-
these issues arise in an especially  acute forn under an integrated  approach so it is important  to
address  these. For examnple,  since an integrated  agency represents  a significant  concentration  of
power, ensuring that its powers cannot be used to serve political rather than administrative
purposes  needs  to be carefully  examined.
2.2  In addition  to reviewing  these issues, this section will also consider  the extent to which
the alleged benefits of integrated regulation have actually been delivered in  the Northern.
European  experience. ]Tn  addition,  it will also review  some of the common  administrative  issues
that emerged from these countries' experience  in bringing their integrated agencies into being.
Of particular importance in this respect is the contrast between the gradualist, evolutionary
approach to integratiorn  that was followed in the Scandinavian  countries and the "Big Bang'
approach  to integration  that was adopted in the UK.  Whereas  the Scandinavian  IFSSAs were
formed  from the creation  of only two agencies,  themselves  the product  of prior consolidation,  the
UK approach has been to integrate no fewer than nine existing regulators with significantly
different  previous  cultures  and experience.
A brief comparative  history
2.3  As noted above,  the current  trend towards IFS  SAs began in Northern  Europe,  s:pecifically
in the  Scandinavian countries of Norway, Denmark and Sweden.  The strong s milarities
between these countries' economic  and financial  systems,  as well as their political systems and
cultures,  has produced  many similarities  in terms of the basic structure  and organization  of their
integrated regulatory agencies.  They also report having been influenced by broad y similar
considerations  in making the move towards an integrated  approach  to regulation  and tc having
reaped many of the same benefits from this approach.  Chief among these benefits has been
obtaining  economies  of scale in the use of scarce  regulatory  resources  in a comparatix  -Iy small,
highly  concentrated  financial  systems  in which  financial  conglomerate  groups  predomirat:e.
2.4  Norway was the first country  to establish  an IFSSA in 1986,  by merging its Balding and
Insurance  Inspectorates.  Its decision  to do so was the outcome  of a long process of con  ,olidation
in its regulatory  system, Its Bank Inspectorate  could trace its history back to the end  )f the last
century, when it was established  for the supervision  of savings banks.  The supervision  of the
commercial  banks was added to its responsibilities  in the 1920s. Banking supervisior  has thus
never been formally part of the responsibilities  of the Norwegian central bank, and  ience the
4creation of a unified regulatory authority did not involve any significant dilution of the central
bank's range of powers.  Indeed, a proposal in 1974 for the merger of the bank inspectorate with
the central bank was defeated in Parliament.
2.5  In 1983 the Banking Inspectorate further acquired some of the functions of the securities
bureau of the Ministry of Finance.  While the Ministry continued to be responsible for regulating
the Oslo Stock Exchange - the only organized financial market in Norway - responsibility for
the prudential supervision of specialist securities firms and investment management firms was
vested in the Banking Inspectorate.  The justification  for this merger of functions was that the
Norwegian banks were already the most active participants in the securities markets, and hence
bringing the supervision of non-bank  securities firms within the Bank Inspectorate's  range of
functions was simply a natural extension of its role in overseeing their activities.  It represented
the addition of approximately ten members of staff to the Inspectorate's complement.  The final
stage of regulatory consolidation occurred in 1986 with the merger of the banking and insurance
inspectorates.
2.6  Since  1986 Norway's  single regulatory  agency, the Kredittilsynet,  has performed  the
regulation of banks, non-bank investment firms, and insurance companies, primarily in respect of
their solvency.  The Kredittlsynet is also responsible for the regulation of real estate brokers and
auditing firms.  (See Box 2.1).  It does not have responsibility for supervising the Oslo Stock
Exchange at present, although this will shortly be transferred to it by the Ministry of Finance.
The Kredittilsynet is under the direction of a Director General and a five person  supervisory
board.  Both ultimately report to the Ministry of Finance.
Box 2.1:  Norway
LThe  Board
Of  Mrecta.  G  me-f
I  5  tfurl  ' 2.7  Denmark  established  its  IFSSA  in  1988,  two  years  after  Norway.  Like  Norway's
Kredittilsynet,  the  Danish  Finanstilsynet  was  formed  from  the  merger  of  its  bankiirng  and
insurance regulatory agencies.  It also has a similar range of responsibilities to the Kredittilsynet
(see Box 2.2).  As in Noiway, the banking supervisory authority had enjoyed a long history as an
agency outside the central bank.  It had also combined the prudential supervision of nion-bank
securities firms as part of its responsibilities prior  to the creation of a fully integrated agency.
The evolution of Denmark's regulatory system is shown in Annex 1.  However, the creation of
the Danish IFSSA was  largely an administrative arrangement, and  there was no fundamental
review of legislation governing its supervisory activities at the time of the merger.  As  such it
operates under  a number of different  statutes inherited from predecessor  organizations.  The
sector legislation has been adjusted and harmonized successively during the nineties.  Similarly,
its governance arrangements have not been fully unified.
BOX 2.2. DANISH  FINANCIAL  SUPERVISORY  AUTHORITY
___________  The Danish Insurance Council
Management  The  Danish  Securities  Council
I  _  ~~~~~~~~~The  Danish  Pension  Market
(  nationl 
coursellor
Banking  Division
Computer  Services  Division
Investiment  Copanies  and UCITS*  Division
Insurance  Brokers,  etc. Division
Insurance  Technique  Division
Life and Pension  Insurance  Division
G  enea  nuac  and Reinsurance  Division|
Credit  Risk Division
MrkitsRiosk  Division
Mortgage  Credit  Division
Finance,  Infornation and Personnel  Division
Division  of Economics,  Statistics,  Accountancy  and
*Undertakings  for Collective  Investment  in  Transferable  Securities
The  presentation  of the divisions  follows  the alphabetical  order  used  in the Danish  organization  cl ar_
62.8  Sweden's IFSSA, also called the Finans Inspektionen, was established in 1991.  Its range
of responsibilities  are  similar to  those  of its  sister  organizations in  the  other  Scandinavian
countries (see Box 2.3)  Its governance arrangements are similar to those operated in Norway,
although with a  less  independent supervisory board.  Once  more the banking and  insurance
inspectorates  had  a  long  history,  and  the  decision  to  merge  them  was  taken  against  the
background of enhanced bank/insurance linkages.  A further factor was the desire to  achieve
economies of scale and to  enhance Sweden's international presence  (unlike either Norway or
Denmark, Sweden is a member of the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision and therefore a
regular participant in one of the leading international forums for regulatory policy.)  In addition,
the  formation  of  Sweden's  IFSSA  was  a  response  to  the  banking  crisis  which  Sweden
experienced in 1990-91. A final factor behind Sweden's decision was the observation that other
Scandinavian countries had already adopted the integrated approach.
Box 2.3 Sweden  Finans  Inspektione
BOARD  OF  DIRECTORS  DIECTOR  GENERAL
DIRECTOR  GENERAL'S OFFICE
CHIEF  LEGAL COUNSEL  ADMINISTRATIVE
COMMUNICATIONS  DEPARTMENT
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS  DOCUMENTATION
POLICY AND CGORDINATION  INTERNAL ACCOUNTING  AND
CONTROL
STAFF SECTIONS  IT AND
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
CONStlMER INTERESTSPESNL PERSONNEL
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND  EEGNYPANN
REGULATION  ~~~~~~EMERGENCY  PLANNING
REGULATION
INSURANCE MARKET  CREDIT MARKET  SECURITIES MARKET
DEPARTMENT  DEPARTMENT  DEPARTMENT
FINANCIAL ANALYSIS  FINANCIAL ANALYSIS  FINANCIAL ANALYSIS
OPERATIONAL SUPERVISION  OPERATIONAL SUPERVISION  OPERATIONAL  SUPERVISION
LICENCES  AND LEGAL  ISSUES  LICENCES AND LEGAL ISSUES  LICENCES AND LEGAL ISSUES
2.9  Against this background, Finland's decision not to adopt a fully integrated approach to
supervision, despite many superficial points of similarity with the other Scandinavian countries,
also means that it represents a useful point of comparison.  To a large extent the Finnish system
of regulation followed that of Norway, Denmark and Sweden until the late  1980s.  As in the
7Scandinavian  countries,  Finland  had  for  a  long  time  regulated  its  banks  through  a  Bank
Inspectorate outside the central bank.  This had acquired the responsibility  for the prudential
regulation of non-bank  securities firms in  1979.  However, the conclusions drawn fr)m  their
banking crisis by the Finnish authorities differed from those  drawn elsewhere in  Scaw&L'navia.
Norway persisted with  ilts integrated agency notwithstanding  criticisms of its handling  of the
banking crisis, and Sweden adopted its integrated approach partly in consequence of i.s crisis.
By contrast, Finland drew the conclusion that its bank crisis pointed to the need to enhance the
linkages between its banking supervisors and the Bank of Finland, and to this end created the
Financial Supervision Authority which is independent in its decisionmaking but administratively
connected to the Bank of Finland.  See organizational chart below (Box 2.4).  Note  that the
FSA's organization does not have an administrative or personnel department because of the close
administrative link with the central bank.
FINLAND
Box 2.4  FINANCIAL  SUPERVISION  AUTHORITY
Parliamentary  Supervisory  Council  |
Board of the Barc 
= Finland  J
Board of the Financial Supervision Authority
Director General
l  Credit Institutions  - |  Capital Markets  Support Services
Department  Departmnent  Department
Deputy Director General  Deputy Director General  Deputy Director General
_Deputy  Head  of Departmentt_._.. 
Sectoral Analysis Office  Regulations Office  Financial Statenie.its/
Institutional Supervision Office  Supervision Office  Solvency Of ice
Legal Services Office  Market Supervision Office  Communicationis  and
Document Ser  ices
Payments Systems Expert  International A:fairs
Senior Risk Analyst  Information Systerms  Office
Intemnal  Servi  e,
2.10  A  further  difference  between  Finland  and  the  other  Scandinavian  countries  is  that
compulsory  private  sector  pension  schemes  are  also  a major  component  of its financial  s3stem.
Until recently they have been regulated together with insurance companies by a specialist bureau
within the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health.  However, from April  1999 this respor sibility
was transferred to a new specialist Insurance Supervision Authority. Our interlocutors in -inland
argued that the structure of Finland's financial system, and in particular the issues surr( unding
the regulation of the private pension  schemes, made a fully integrated approach to  re{  u: ation
inappropriate for their country, at least for the foreseeable future.
82.11  For different reasons, the United Kingdom's adoption of unified regulation stands out as
something  of  an  exception  among  northern  European  countries.  Unlike  the  Scandinavian
countries, the UK is home to an international financial center and its domestic financial services
industry is much larger, more diverse and less concentrated than in Scandinavia.  Furthernore,
the UK's Financial Services Authority is responsible for both prudential and conduct of business
regulation, unlike its counterparts in Scandinavia which have focussed on prudential regulation
only  (see  Annex 2  for an  organization chart).  Finally, the  formation  of the FSA  has  been
undertaken as a radical, 'Big  Bang'  measure, bringing together nine existing regulatory bodies.
By contrast, the Scandinavian integrated regulators were the product of a long process of agency
consolidation,  and  were  formed  primarily  from  the  merger  of  banking  and  insurance
inspectorates.  Nonetheless, the fact that the UK's decision to create an IFSSA has been taken
against a very different background to that of the Scandinavian countries means that it can serve
as a valuable point of contrast.
The Northern European Rationale for Integration
2.12  The rationale for bringing together banking, securities, and insurance regulation within a
single organization has been most fully explored by the Norwegian Royal Commission which
reported  in  1985.3  Its  conclusions  have  been  endorsed,  at  least  implicitly,  by  the  other
Scandinavian countries that have established IFSSAs.  Essentially, the Commission stated the
rationale for integrated supervision to have two main  limbs.  First  of all, it was argued that
integrated  supervision  would  permit  more  effective  supervision  of  financial  conglomerates.
Secondly, it was argued that the merger would also permit economies of scale to be obtained in
regulation, especially better leverage of resources in administration and infrastructure support.
2.13  With  regard to  the  argument  about  the  supervision  of  financial  conglomerates,  the
Norwegian Royal Commission advanced a number of claims:
*  Insurance companies played an important role as investment brokers and there were signs
of increased cooperation between banking and insurance businesses (i.e. the formation of
"bancassurance" groups.)
*  Supervision  of  banking  and  insurance  shared  common  features,  as  did  legislation
governing the two sectors.
*  Licensing  and  other structural tasks  would  be  better  coordinated under  an  integrated
approach to regulation.
2.14  Thus  the  growth  of  bancassurance  business  - i.e.  financial  conglomerate  groups
combining  both  banking  and  insurance  activities  - was regarded  as a  powerful  reason  for
adopting an integrated approach to supervision.  The importance of bank-insurance linkages in
driving the  process  of  regulatory  integration  was reflected  in  other  Scandinavian countries.
Denmark followed Norway's  lead by  creating a unified regulatory  authority  in  1988.  As  in
Norway the desire to achieve more effective regulation of financial conglomerates was one of the
primary factors influencing the Danish decision to move to a fully integrated approach.  Similar
3  Unfortunately,  this  report  has  not been  translated  from  the  Norwegian.
9factors were also at wor]k  in Sweden.  Experience with banking crises in these countries (see Box
2.5) also influenced thinking on the integration issue.
Box 2.5. The Scandinavian Banking Crises
The banking  crises experienced  by Norway,  Sweden  and Finland  in the early 1990s  had an
undoubted  impact  on the authorities'  decisions  concerning  the most appropriate  structure  of
regulation. Although  the crises  themselves  followed  a similar  pattern, and appear  to have had similar
causes,  their impact  on the structure  of regulation  differed  significantly  between  Norway  an  A  Sweden
on the one hand and Finland  on the other.
The Scandinavian  banking  crises followed  a period  of significant  domestic  overheating  which
was followed  by the collapse  of asset prices  and severe  recessions  in each of the three countries. This
macroeconomic  picture  was combined  with the structural  characteristics  of a recently  deregulated
banking  sector  and poor micro-level  risk control in the banks  themselves  to generate  a severe  banking
sector  crisis in all three countries. The crisis emerged  first in Norway,  where banks loan losses
climbed  from 0.7% of total loans in 1987  to 6% in 1991. Similarly,  in Finland,  loan losses  rose from
0.5% in 1989  to 4.7% in 1992. The rise was most abrupt  in Sweden  which experienced  a rise from
0.3% in 1989  to 7% in 1992. In Norway,  the resolution  costs of the banking  crisis in 1991-92
amounted  to NKr 19.2  billion (2.6% of GDP),  while  at the height of the Swedish  banking  crisis total
commitments  (including  government  guarantees)  stood at SKr 85 billion (5.9% of GDP). In Finland,
by the end of 1996,  the total amount  of public bank support  disbursed  was Fmk 56.6 billion
(approximately  10%  of GDP).
Source:  Burkhard  Drees  and  Ceyla  Pazarbasioglu,  The  Nordic  Banking Crisis: Pitfalls  in Financial
Liberalization?,  International  Monetary  Fund  Occasional  Paper  161,  April  1998.
2.15  The second limb of the justification for integrated supervision was the argumenit that an
integrated agency will be able to achieve significant economies of scale.  This justifica1  ion had a
number of different dimensions.  In the  first place,  it was argued that centralizing rt-gulatory
fiunctions and  activities  can  permit  significant  gains  from  economies  of  scale  through  the
development of joint  ad[ministrative, IT and  other support functions.  In addition,  it was also
argued that  it  would assist  in the recruitment  and  retention  of  suitably  qualified  ri,gulatory
personnel, who might perceive that the career opportunities  available to them in an iuitegrated
organization will be significantly greater than in a series of specialist agencies.  Finally, it was
also argued that it perm'its the regulatory authority to achieve efficiencies in the deplc yrnent of
staff with rare intellectual capital.  This has been especially influential among the Scar dinavian
countries that have needed to maximize their use of scarce human resources if they are t  be able
to  participate fully in international regulatory  forums.  Economies  can also be  attai led  with
regard to the gathering and using of know-how in specialist areas and to the developmnent  and
improvement of supervisory methods.  This economy of scale argument-which  might equally
be  termed  the  "small country  argument"  -is  cited  by  all  the  Scandinavian  countlics  as  a
significant factor in their adoption of an integrated approach.
2.16  Notwithstanding the very different size and nature of its financial sector with th(u  se of the
Scandinavian countries the formation of the FSA in the United Kingdom, has been juslified  on
10similar grounds to  these.  Particular emphasis has been  given to  the  consideration  that the
emergence of financial conglomerate groups requires an integrated approach to their supervision.
Announcing the decision to create the FSA on 20th May 1997, Chancellor Brown declared that
the blurring of boundaries between different categories of financial intermediary necessitated a
radical rethink of the structure of regulation.  A further justification has been advanced by Briault
[1999]. Apart from the noteworthy growth in financial conglomerates, he stresses-writing  from
an FSA vantage point-a  number of factors that relate to regulatory efficiency and effectiveness
and substantiate the case for the integrated regulator model:
•  Economies of scale and scope that arise because a single regulator can take advantage of
a single set of central support services;
*  Increased efficiency in allocation of regulatory resources across both regulated firms and
types of regulated activities;
*  The ease with which the integrated regulator can resolve efficiently and effectively the
conflicts that inevitably emerge between the different objectives of regulation;
*  The avoidance of unjustifiable differences in supervisory approaches and the competitive
inequalities  imposed on regulated firms  through  inconsistent  rules  which  have  arisen
across multiple specialist regulators, and;
*  If an integrated regulator is given a clear set of responsibilities then it should be possible
to increase supervisory transparency and accountability.
2.17  By  contrast,  Finland  has  not  accepted  the  case  that  the  formation  of  financial
conglomerates necessitates  an  integrated  approach  to  their  supervision.  In  any  event,  the
pressure has been muted reflecting the difficulty of combining a unique system of a compulsory
pension and other social insurance with a market based financial supervision.  Because of the
relatively less developed bank-insurance linkages compared with other Scandinavian countries,
there has not been pressure for an integrated supervision either.  However, practical co-operation
between  the  FSA  and  the  ISA  is  being  developed  to  be  efficient.  To  ensure  this,  the
compositions of the Boards of the FSA and ISA are as similar as possible so as to enable closer
co-operation between the two supervisory authorities.
2.18  Moreover, it should be noted that integrated supervision is not the only way of attempting
to  achieve significant economies of  scale.  The Finnish  example, where  the FSA  shares the
support infrastructure of the central bank, might offer an  alternative model short of the fully
integrated  approaches  adopted  in  Denmark,  Norway  and  Sweden.  By  making  use  of  the
administrative  services (e.g.  data  collection,  all  administrative  support  and  human  resource
functions bought from  the Bank  of Finalsn,  the Finnish FSA  has  also been  able to  achieve
significant scale economies.  It  should  also be  stressed  that significant professional  synergy
benefits relate to the close supervisory cooperation with the central bank as regards the payment
systems and electronic money.
2.19  Finally, although not part of the official justification for integrated supervision, a further
factor behind the creation of a number of IFSSAs may also have been the desire to improve the
quality of supervision of specific industrial sectors.  In a number of Scandinavian countries the
Insurance Inspectorate was criticized for adopting a largely reactive interpretation of its role.  For
example,  prior  to  the  formation  of  the  Kredittilsynet  in  1986,  the  Norwegian  Insurance
11Inspectorate had perfornmed  only off-site supervision.  In recent years, however, the N:rvwegian
regulatory authority has practiced on-site inspections of both banks and insurance companies,
often  employing  the  same  teams  of  inspectors  for  both  types  of  company.  A,  similar
consideration seems to have been at work in Sweden's decision to unify its regulator)  system.
The influence of the more proactive approach of the banking supervisors was seen as being a
valuable benefit.
The Scope of Regulatory Powers and Responsibilities
2.20  The Scandinavian countries exhibit significant similarities in the scope  and powers of
their integrated regulatory agencies.  All have a focus primarily on prudential rather than conduct
of business regulation.  A.lthough each of the integrated commissions has a role in supervising
business conduct on the stock exchange, as well as detecting insider dealing, responsibility for
dealing with customer complaints and the transaction-by-transaction dealings of firms with their
customers tends to reside elsewhere.  Consumer protection issues tend to  be regarded by the
Scandinavian regulators as being outside their area of responsibility and to be best left t)  various
industry Ombudsman schemes.  Instead, their focus is primarily on ensuring the solvency of the
firms for which they are responsible - especially banks and insurance companies.
2.21  However,  within  this  broad  similarity  of  approach,  the  detail  of  the  powers  of  the
Scandinavian authorities does exhibit significant variation.  For example, the Swedish Finans
Inspektionen has the power to license institutions, reject board members and the CEO as being
not  "fit  and  proper",  inspect  institutions,  request  information,  and  make  institution-specific
standards and directions.  On the other hand, it does not have the power to remove directors and
auditors,  suspend  operations,  transfer  engagements  between  institutions  or  to  appoint  an
administrator.  By contrast, the Danish Finanstilsynet does enjoy almost the full range of these
powers, although it does not have the power to make institution-specific standards and it may
remove  auditors  although  not  directors.  Norway's  Kredittilsynet  may  grant  liceir  ses  and
authorizations of  insurance  companies  and  securities  firms,  but  not  banks,  where  ihe  final
decision resides with the Ministry of Finance.  Similarly, with regard to decisions concein:lng  the
revocation  of  the  license  of  a  major  financial  intermediary,  the  Kredittilsynet  will  make
recommendations to the Ministry of Finance, but the latter will have the final say.
2.22  The extent to  which  legislation has been harmonized across the three  main inrdustrial
sectors - banking, securities and insurance - also exhibits significant variation.  The NMrwvegian
Kredittilsynet operates oni  the basis of a single underpinning statute that applies across ihe three
main industrial sectors.  However, the regulatory process itself continues to  exhibit si ;nificant
variation across sectors. 4 By contrast, Sweden and Denmark continue to regulate the ldifferent
industrial  sectors  according  to  different  legislation.  Denmark's  legislation  is  tle  least
harmonized of the three countries, although this does not in practice seem to have resulted in any
serious problems and an effort is in any case currently under way to improve the coherer ce of its
legislative framework.
4  It is to be noted,  however,  that  the Norwegian  Kredittilsynet  has uniquely  pioneered  an approach  to insv  rance
company  supervision  under  which companies  are required  to mreet  both  the traditional  solvency  margin  test anid  also
to meet the risk  assets  ratio  test normally  applied  to banks.
122.23  The Treasury in the United Kingdom is currently working to revise financial legislation
that will succeed existing laws relating to banking, securities and insurance legislation.  The new
Act will govern all of the activities of the FSA.  In the meantime the FSA is functioning under
the old legal framework which in practice means that some units are at present reporting to both
the new FSA board and their old boards.  The evolution of financial supervision in the UK has
been quite different from that in Scandinavia in that much heavier emphasis has been placed on
conduct of business as opposed to prudential aspects.  Indeed there are about twice as many staff
working on conduct of business/consumer protection issues in the FSA as there are working on
prudential aspects.
2.24  One  undoubted  benefit  of  the  integrated  approach  when  compared  with  specialist
regulatory agencies is that it is less likely that specific regulatory problems will be lost in the
gaps between regulatory jurisdictions.  A number of cases in the UK - ranging from Barings to
the sale of so-called Home Income Plans5 - had contributed to the perception that too many
problems were simply falling between regulatory agencies.  The formation of a single regulatory
body has been deliberately designed to eliminate the possibility that disputes over regulatory turf
may result in certain types of financial activity going unregulated, or inadequately regulated.  In
theory the existence of a single regulatory agency also makes it much easier to extend its powers
as new products emerge.  However, there is also a risk  in this, as some of the Scandinavian
regulators have found.  A single financial services regulator can suffer from a "Christmas tree"
effect, in which heterogeneous responsibilities are gradually added to its range of functions.  This
may eventually result in a situation in which it becomes overburdened with a series of functions
which  are  at  best  tangentially  connected  to  the  agency's  primary  objective  but  of  which
government departments have been keen to divest themselves.
Mechanisms of governance, accountability and funding
2.25  The governance arrangements for the three integrated Scandinavian authorities exhibit
marked  similarities.  All  three  have  been  established  as  independent  agencies  outside  the
government,  headed  by  a  director  general,  and  under the  general  supervision  of  a  relevant
govermnent ministry, either finance or economic affairs.  The Ministry is able to  set the broad
parameters of the regulatory agencies' work, and is the main mechanism through which they are
made accountable to parliament.  However, the degree to which the Ministry is able to interfere
in  day-to-day operational  decisions  is  limited  by  the  culture  of  open  government  which  is
characteristic of the Scandinavian countries.  Moreover, the independence of these agencies is
bolstered to differing degrees by the existence of supervisory boards that act as an independent
check on the Ministry's relationship with the supervisory agency.  However, there are significant
differences in the role and responsibilities of these boards, and it is the culture of transparency
that is primarily responsible for allowing these agencies are able to operate free from government
interference and control.
5  Home  Income  Plans  permitted  their,  mainly  elderly,  clients  to swap  equity  in the family  home for current
income. Some  of these  plans were premised  on optimistic  investment  returns  that  would  permit  the purchasers  both
to service  the equity-releasing  loan  and to enjoy significant  income  in excess  of this obligation. In the event,  many
investments  failed  to make  returns  which  were adequate  even  to service  the debt obligations.
132.26  Overall responsibility for the day-to-day operational work of the three integrated agenrcies
is in the hands of a Director General.  In each case the Government makes the appointment o  f the
Director General.  In Denmark the Director General is appointed by the Queen (in effect by the
Minister  of  Economic  Aifairs)  and  a  similar  arrangement  applies  in  Norway,  where  the
appointment is fortnally made by the King in Council, but in practice by the Finance Minister.
The Swedish government also appoints the Director General of its FSA.
2.27  The institutional mechanisms for ensuring agency independence are strongest in Norway.
The Norwegian  Kredittilsynet is answerable to a supervisory board comprising five independent
members (i.e. members without current ministerial or political functions), drawn from academia,
the regulated industries and,  public service.  It serves to insulate the Kredittilsynet from political
pressure and can act as a buffer between the regulatory authority and the Finance Ministry.  The
Director General is able tc report to the supervisory board matters  on which he has received
directions from the Ministry, and hence an independent check can be exercised on the use of
ministerial directions.  More generally, the supervisory board approves the annual supervisory
plan to which the Kredittilsynet works.  The Kredittilsynet's budget, however, is approved by the
Finance Ministry, and the supervisory board does not play any role in the appointment of the
Director General.
2.28  The Finance Ministry is also empowered to set the general guidelines and parameters of
the Kredittilsynet's work, although responsibility  for their  implementation and for  operational
issues clearly resides with the Kredittilsynet itself and with the supervisory board.  Following the
banking crisis of the early  1990s, the respective roles and responsibilities of the Ministry  and
Kredittilsynet were clarified with  the result that all Ministry  guidelines and  directions  to the
Kredittilsynet must now be  in writing.  This requirernent, combined with the  strong emphasis
which exists in Norway on. the openness of government and the disclosure of official papers,
serves to further strengthen the independence of the Kredittilsynet vis-a-vis the Finance Ministry.
2.29  While  both Sweden  and Denmark  have also  established  supervisory boards  for  their
regulatory agencies, they are less important than in Norway  for ensuring agency independence
and accountability.  In Sweden  less emphasis is given to  ensuring the "independence"  of the
supervisory  board.  It  coimprises eight  members,  of  whom  two  are  current  members  of
parliament.  The other members include a justice  of the Supreme Court, representatives  )f the
Finance Ministry, Riksbank, and National Debt Office, and a former industry practitioner,  The
supervisory board decides the application of formal sanctions to firms, and has the authorltv to
make rules under the delegated powers of the relevant statutes.  It proposes to the Govern  ment
Finans Inspektionen's budget.  Unlike in Norway, where the chairman of the supervisory bc ird is
one of the "independent" members, in Sweden the Director General also chairs the super,,  isory
board, making his role much more powerful  than that of his Norwegian  counterpart.  As in
Norway, the primary guarantee of agency independence is regarded as being the transparency of
decision-making processes.
2.30  In Denmark the Finanstilsynet operates not to one supervisory board but to two.  'Vlven
the integrated agency was created in  1988 the supervisory boards of its predecessor age  Llcies
were  not  unified.  This  has  meant  that  on  matters  concerning  the  insurance  industrr  the
14Finanstilsynet reports to an Insurance Council, which is currently chaired by a Supreme Court
judge,  and  which comprises members representing  the industry,  consumers  and  independent
members appointed by the Ministry of Economic Affairs.  With regard to the securities market
the Finanstilsynet reports to a Securities Council which also exercises oversight of the rules of
the Stock Exchange.  This complex reporting arrangement acts as a filter between the Ministry of
Economic Affairs and the regulatory agency to some extent, but it should be noted that there is
no independent oversight of the Finanstilsynet's activities concerning the supervision of banks.
In this case its relationship with the Ministry is immediate and direct, although experience has
shown that successive ministers have been less prone to interfere in regulatory decisions than
have the Insurance or Securities Councils.
2.31  The FSA in the  United Kingdom  is governed by  a Board  appointed by  the Treasury
(Ministry of Finance).  The Board comprises three executive Managing Directors and ten non-
executive members.  The Deputy Governor (Financial Stability) of the Bank of England is an ex
officio  director.  The Non-executive  Directors-comprising  senior  managers  from  financial
institutions and industry as well as academics-review  the operations of the FSA and oversee the
mechanisms of financial control.  The FSA is accountable to  Treasury Ministers and, through
them, to Parliament.  To improve accountability to the public at large, the FSA has  set up a
consumer panel and a practitioner forum that will, in due course, become  statutory under the
Financial Services and Markets Act.
2.32  The independence of regulatory agencies can be further bolstered by the existence of a
dedicated funding source separate from that of the general government budget.  However, the
need for financial independence for the regulatory agencies needs also to be  balanced by the
need for accountability in the way in which revenues are raised and spent.  In the Scandinavian
countries these demands have been met by an arrangement under which the funding of integrated
regulatory agencies is based on an industry levy which is paid to directly to the government.  The
government then awards the regulatory agency an amount identical to  the sum raised by the
industry levy.  Overall control of the budget of the regulatory agencies thus remains in the hands
of the  Finance  Ministry, but  the existence of  an  industry  levy  provides the  funding  of the
agencies with a significant degree of independence.
2.33  It  should  be  noted,  however,  that  Finland  has  adopted  a  fundamentally  different
approach.to  the governance arrangements for its regulatory authority.  In  1993 it replaced its
Banking  Inspectorate, which  had  been  an  autonomous  agency  reporting  to  the  Minister  of
Finance with a Financial Supervision Authority which is administratively linked to the central
bank.  Although the Finnish FSA is independent in its decision-making, and has its own enabling
statute and powers, the links with the central bank are very close. FSA staff are employees of the
Bank  of  Finland  and  all  administrative  services  (e.g.  accounting,  personnel  and  training,
administration functions, security services, publication services, translation services) are bought
from the central bank.  In addition to the administrative services, the co-operation between the
FSA and the Bank of Finland is prominent and continuous(e.g. financial market stability issues
and supervision of payment  and settlement systems).  The FSA's  budget is  approved by the
central bank board, not the Ministry of Finance.  However, the FSA's operating costs are covered
by supervision fees and processing fees paid by the supervised entities.  The board of the FSA
comprises, in  addition to the Director General of the FSA, representatives  from the Bank  of
15Finland, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health and the In ,urance
Supervision Authority.  The Chairman of the Board is from the Bank of Finland.  While i:r  should
be noted that the Finnish FSA is not a genuinely integrated financial regulator - it is responsible
only  for  banking  and  securities  regulation  - this  governance  arrangement  may  be  worth
considering in countries wvhere  there are concerns about insulating regulation sufficient.y from
political  interference.  In  many  jurisdictions  the  central  bank  is  now  legally  (or  even
constitutionally) guaranteed its independence.  This means it may be able to insulate regulation
from political pressures to a significant degree.
Internal Organization of the Integrated Agencies
2.34  One of the main justifications  for creating integrated regulatory agencies has been the
growing convergence of the main industrial sectors of banking, securities and insurance.  In the
Scandinavian countries, the  growth  of financial  conglomerates  combining  both  banking  and
insurance business was especially influential.  However, despite the fact that one of the main
reasons for adopting the integrated approach to regulation was to enable regulators better to deal
with  the  problems  associated  with  supervising  financial  conglomerates,  an  administrative
structure adapted to this task has been hard to find.
2.35  The integrated commissions still tend to be largely organized on institutional rather than
functional or product lines.  Thus the Swedish  Finans Inspektionen has three main supervisory
departments,  dealing  witlh the  insurance,  credit,  and  securities  markets  respectively.  Each
department conducts financial  analysis, operational  supervision  and deals  with  licensing  and
legal  issues relating to  the group  of institutions  it is responsible  for  supervising.  A similar
structure  was followed  in. Denmark  until  quite  recently.  However,  under  a  recent  intemal
reorganization - the fourth such to have been undertaken since the Finanstilsynet was created in
1988 - a larger number of small departments have been created.  The focus of this organizational
structure continues to  follow  largely  institutional  lines, for  example with  departments  being
formed to regulate the large comnmercial  banks, small commercial and savings banks, arid non-
bank investment firms.  One motivation behind this most recent reorganization is to facilitate the
emergence of a matrix structure in which "centers of expertise" is developed with the at  lity to
collect know-how that  can be  applied  across a  number of  different  departments.  A  iurther
motivation has also undoubtedly been the desire to break down some of the entrenched  Lgency
cultures that tend to persist when the separate regulatory agencies continue a de facto ex' si  ence
as divisions within an integrated agency.  All the Scandinavian integrated agencies reportid that
the  elimination  of  pre-existing  agency  cultures  had  been  exceptionally  difficult  (si-e  the
discussion of administrative problems in creating an integrated agency at the end of this se;.tion.)
2.36  Norway  has also experimented with  a number of different organizational forms for its
integrated financial regulator.  Two divisions now regulate most of the companies for wh'clc the
Kredittilsynet is responsible.  One, the Finance and Insurance department, is concerned vvth1  the
solvency of  both  banks  and  insurance  companies.  However,  an  attempt  to  integrat,  their
regulation fully, with the same team of examiners being responsible for both banks and ins' irnce
companies, has not been judged  a success.  The loss of industry specific expertise outw::ighed
the gains in consistency achieved in the supervision of financial conglomerates.  As a res Alt  the
16supervision  of insurance  undertakings has  been  re-established  as  a  separate  unit  under  an
assistant director within this department.  The other main department within the Kredittilsynet is
responsible  for the supervision of the  capital markets, including  non-bank  investment firms.
This division is also concemed with the regulation of real estate agents and brokers and debt
collection firms, all of which fall within the Kredittilsynet's area of responsibility.
2.37  The  United Kingdom's  FSA  is  divided into  three main  areas:  financial  supervision;
authorization, enforcement and consumer relations, and; support services.  Within the financial
supervision  area  the  work  remains  organized  broadly  along  institutional  lines  although  a
"  complex group" division has been established to handle the supervision of increasingly complex
major firms.  This division was established to develop a more integrated supervision of "groups",
that is  financial institutions  undertaking a  range of  financial  sector activities  and  trading in
complex  or  innovative instruments.  The  supervision  of  banking  and  securities  business  is
gradually being integrated with a  single manager and team  being responsible for  supervising
both activities.
2.38  As these varied experiences well illustrate, no one model for the internal organization of
an integrated regulatory agency has been notably more successful than any of the others.  All the
agencies in this study remarked on the difficulty in breaking down the entrenched cultures of
their predecessor bodies, a problem which persisted as long as they continued to be organized on
traditional institutional lines.  On the other hand, there are no obvious successful altematives to
this type of administrative structure, at least as long as different regulatory requirements continue
to be appropriate for different industrial sectors.  However, one clear benefit of the integrated
approach to supervision is that it makes possible experimentation with altemative organizational
forms, without running up against the barriers resulting from separate agencies operating under
separate statutory authorities.
Crisis Management Arrangements
2.39  None of the three Scandinavian integrated regulatory bodies was created by removing
the  banking  supervision  function  from  the  central  bank:  in  each  case  the  regulation  of
commercial banks had long  been conducted by a  specialist banking  supervisory body.  This
feature of their shared experience has a number of implications.  In the first place, the creation of
an  integrated agency has not  proved  as contentious in  some other jurisdictions  where  it has
necessitated removing a long-established supervisory function from the central bank.  Secondly,
however,  there  has  also  been  much  less  explicit  consideration  given to  crisis  management
arrangements as has occurred when the banking supervisory function has been removed from the
central bank.  In the latter case it has been considered necessary to find a substitute for the type
of liaison which would normally occur between banking supervisors and the officials responsible
for market operations when both work within a single organization.
2.40  In the United Kingdom a "Memorandum of Understanding" has been agreed between the
FSA, the Bank of England, and the Treasury goveming arrangements for maintaining financial
stability.  A "Standing Committee" has been established with representatives from each of the
three institutions.  This meets monthly but would meet more frequently in the event that serious
17problems, with potential systemic implications, arose.  A clear delineation of responsibili.ies has
been established based upion the principles of item accountability, transparency, no dup: ication
and regular information exchange.  The "head institution" in any situation would depend on the
precise nature of the problem.
2.41  Although the three Scandinavian integrated authorities hold regular meetings wi-h their
respective  central banks,  and  share  informnation about individual  institutions  with  tllem  on
request, none has the kind of formalized crisis management arrangement to be found in tne UK.
There is no equivalent of the Memorandum of Understanding that exists in the UK between the
Treasury, Bank of England, and FSA.  This means that arrangements for dealing with a  crisis
tend to  be  ad  hoc  and  vary  significantly between  countries.  For  example,  the Norvegian
experience of its banking crisis in the early  1990s tends to  suggest that the Kredittilsyriei-  will
play a subordinate role in any financial crisis.  The lead in resolving the crisis of 1990-91 was
taken by  the Finance Ministry  and the  central bank,  as well as  the agencies  established  by
parliament to undertake the recapitalization of the barnking  system.  (It should be noted, however,
that one consequence of the early 1  990s crisis was that the Kredittilsynet embarked on a program
aimed to improve its efficiency and effectiveness and this may mean that its role in any future
crisis would be enhanced.).  By contrast, Denmark's Finanstilsynet has operated pro-actively in
crisis resolution - to  the  extent that the Ministry  has intervened  in order  to  ensure thalt any
departures from its routine practices are in future authorized by the Ministry.  Even under the
new dispensation, howeveir,  there is a clear expectation in the Danish integrated authority that it
would assume the lead role in any financial restructuring.
2.42  These differing arrangements suggest that the approach to  crisis management  adopted
under an integrated systemr  can take a number of different forms, and the extent of central bank
and ministry involvement can also exhibit significant variation. However, it should also be noted
that a significant factor in Finland's decisiorn  not to adopt an integrated approach was pri cisely
that it concluded that close central bank involvement was essential to managing a financial. crisis.
What is  clear  is that  an  iintegrated approach  to  regulation requires  careful  reflection  rn the
mechanisms and approaches which would be adopted should a financial crisis erupt.
An assessment of Northern European experience with integration
2.43  There  is  evidently  significant  variation  in  the  detail  of  the  integrated  appro Lch to
regulation found among the three  Scandinavian countries.  Nevertheless there is also a  strong
consensus in those countri;-s concerning the benefits of integrated supervision.  In none oi' the
three  countries  have  any  regrets  been  expressed  about  the  decision  to  follow  a  pol cy  of
integrated  supervision,  and  there was  a  widespread view  that  it  had  delivered a  numzer  of
significant benefits.  In Denmark, Norway and Sweden it is maintained that the "small country
rationale" for integrated supervision has been conclusively vindicated by subsequent expel ience.
Although it is difficult to measure efficiency gains and economies of scale in any mearningful
sense for these types of admninistrative  agency, all three agencies believe that they have realized
significant benefits from this source.  All of the agencies interviewed believed that they halt been
able to achieve significantly more effective regulation on the basis of limited  resource/  -han
18would have been the case had their regulatory agencies remained separate. 6 While the absence
of hard data to confirm this opinion makes it difficult to arrive at a decisive conclusion that an
integrated  approach  has  generated  regulatory  efficiencies,  the  pervasiveness  of  this  belief
throughout the senior management of the integrated regulatory authorities is striking.  On the
basis of this anecdotal evidence there would thus seem to be some justification  to the "small
country rationale" for integrated regulation.
2.44  There would also seem to be little doubt that the creation of integrated agencies has also
significantly improved the standing of financial regulation in the three Scandinavian countries.
This  has  been  achieved  in  a  number  of  different  ways.  First  of  all,  the  creation  of  a
(comparatively) large,  quasi-autonomous  regulatory  body  has  delivered  a  higher  status  for
regulation  within the  governmental machinery  than  separate  specialist  agencies  could  have
achieved.  On the one hand this has meant that fears that a single integrated authority might be
easier for politicians to influence have been counterbalanced by the enhanced self-confidence of
the regulators themselves.  On the other hand, integrated regulatory agencies appear to have been
more  successful  than  specialist  agencies  in  securing  the  funding  needed  for  the  effective
discharge of their responsibilities.  Small specialist agencies - especially when they exist merely
as bureaus of the Finance Ministry - can struggle to make their case in the annual budget round.
As a result, all too often they are starved of necessary funding and their staff are remunerated at
rates which are uncompetitive with the markets they regulate.
2.45  Secondly, the creation of a high profile agency of sufficient size to  offer  a degree of
career progression for its staff also appears to have contributed to overcoming problems of staff
recruitment and retention.  This has in turn enabled the integrated regulatory agencies to develop
a cadre of professional staff.  The existence of this cadre has in turn contributed to the standing
of the agencies, which has in turn assisted in recruitment/retention, and so on in a virtuous circle.
However, this virtuous circle is not an automatic process.  As the early teething troubles of a
number of the integrated regulatory agencies indicate, building a cadre of professional staff is a
matter calling for great senior management skill.  Simply integrating regulation and sitting back
to wait for it to deliver the expected benefits is not enough.
2.46  The other main limb justifying an integrated approach to regulation is the need to respond
to the formation of financial conglomerates.  In this case the benefits of an integrated approach
have not  been as evident  in  practice  as might have been  expected in theory.  In theory  an
integrated regulatory agency would be an appropriate response to conglomeratization because it
enables regulators to assess risks on a group-wide basis.  By contrast, specialist regulators are
inevitably only concerned with individual entities in a group, and no one regulator has the skills
or  powers to  obtain  a  group-wide perspective.  Secondly, integrated  regulation should  help
eliminate the potential for regulatory arbitrage by financial conglomerates.  By applying a single
set of regulatory requirements across a diversified financial group an integrated agency should in
theory be able to achieve greater clarity and consistency than specialist agencies, and reduce the
6  The numbers  of regulatory  staff  employed  in Denmark,  Norway,  and  Sweden  have continued  to rise throughout
the 1990s. However,  the functions  of the regulatory  agencies  themselves  have expanded  during  this period  - for
example  as the result of the acquisition  of new responsibilities.  This  makes  it difficult  to draw any meaningful
comparisons  of regulatory  efficiency  over time.
19scope  for  one  set  of  regulatory  requirements  being  evaded  by  transactions  being  booked
elsewhere in the group.
2.47  In practice it has been difficult to deliver some of these benefits.  In part the reason for
this has been that in most of the Scandinavian countries - with the exception of Norwav - the
administrative re-organization of regulation was not accompanied by a radical review of existing
legislation.  The Danish example is perhaps the most striking in this regard.  In Denmark the
creation of its Finanstilsynet was undertaken almost exclusively as an administrative matter with
little or no primary legislatlion. This means that over ten years later the Danish Finanstilsynet is
still working with legislation inherited from its predecessor organizations.  The absence of a
single, coherent underpinning financial services statute has inevitably meant that  some of the
alleged benefits  of  an  integrated  approach  to  financial  conglomerates  has  been  difficult  to
deliver.
2.48  The  theoretical  benefits  of  integrated  supervision  have  been  difficult  to  deliver  for
administrative reasons as  well.  As  noted above, no  one model  of  internal organization  has
proved to  be  definitively  superior to any  other.  When the Scandinavian integrated  agencies
began their operations most did so by preserving their predecessor agencies as separate divisions
within the new organization.  This had the disadvantage of preserving a sense of separate identity
and culture amongst these different divisions, with the result that in a number of cases they seem
to have communicated no rmore  successfully than did separate agencies.  On the other hand, more
recent attempts to reorganize the integrated agencies along more "functional" lines (for example
by distinguishing between larger, systemically important institutions and smaller, non-systemic
institutions) have resulted in complex internal matrix management structures.  It is too early to
say  whether these new  organizational forms  will  deliver  the  benefits  in  the  supervision  of
financial conglomerates which  in theory  an  integrated  supervisor  should  be  able  to  deliver.
Perhaps the  best  that  can  be  said  at this  stage  is  that  integrated  regulatory  bodies  permit
experimentation with organizational forms which is denied to specialist agencies, and fro-n this
process of experiment a more effective solution might be found.
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3.1  Northern European  experience  suggests  that there are two critical issues that need to be
addressed  if an integrated  agency is to be successfully  established. First, it is important  that the
transition  for the individual  specialized  agencies  to the unified  agency  is managed effectively. In
this context it is vital, once the decision has been made to make the transition to an integrated
agency,  to develop  an implementation  plan that will dictate  the path from the fragmented  to the
integrated model.  Second, once the  integrated agency is  in  place  there is  a  range of
administrative  and personnel  issues that must be addressed. It is appropriate  that these be done
in the context  of a well managed  change  program. The Scandinavian  experience  can shed light
on the transitional  issues as the agencies  concerned  have now had time to "settle" in the wake of
the merger. The UK FSA offers  the most recent experience  however  and this in the context of a
"big bang" involving  some 1800  staff in London.
The path to integration
3.2  There is a major question  at the outset regarding  the pace of transition  to the new agency.
On the one hand a long lead time can help ensure  that an effective  plan has been put in place and
that all the details  of the transition  process  itself have been ironed out in advance. On the other,
a long transition period can mean that the individual fragmented  agencies and their managers
become,  in a sense,  "lame ducks." Important  decisions  on IT development  and staffing  and even
core decisions  on supervisory  issues may be delayed pending the establishment  of the new
agency. In some countries  concerns  about establishing  a revised  legal framework  to govern the
working of the integrated  agency  will militate  in favor  of an extended  transition  period. In other
countries-the UK FSA is a good example  here-a  "big bang" integration  was followed. There
was a conscious  decision  to move ahead more quickly  with the physical  integration  process even
though  the new the legal framework  was not in place. As noted earlier  this meant  that there were
a number of sub-optimal  practices (such as reporting to old and new boards) that had to be
retained  for a time. There was a recognition  in the FSA that not all of the problems  associated
with a "big bang"  merger could be solved  overnight  and that some flexibility  was needed  to find
workable solutions to  problems as they arose.  On balance it is desirable to complete the
implementation  phase  as quickly  as possible.
3.3  There is also an issue as to whether  a country  that may have a strong case for integrating
its  agencies-such  as  a  small country with  a  highly integrated financial sector-should
consciously  delay considering  an integrated  structure  as a policy option. Such might happen if
the country  feared disrupting  a relatively new but fragmented  organizational  structure  as is the
case in some transition economies.  Proponents of this approach argue that the benefits of
integration could be reaped in a fragmented structure  by simply ensuring that there is a high
degree of cooperation and information flow between the agencies.  The pertinent counter-
argument  is that delaying  such a decision will serve  to cement  in place  the existing  structure  and
the separate  cultures  and systems  that evolve. This would  make the eventual,  possibly inevitable
process of integration all the more difficult to achieve.  The box below illustrates  the added
factors  that come into play when considering  integration  in a transition  environment.
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There are a number of very unique  problems  that come into play when a transition economy
decides  to move  to an integrated  model of supervision  from a fragmented  one. In most instances  in E.
Europe and the Former Soviet  Union there has been a significant  effort to strengthen  the supervisory
framework for  banks, often with  substantial technical assistance from  international financial
institutions  or bilateral donors. The incidence  of banking  crises in a number of these countries  has
intensified  the effort  to bolster capacity  in the banking  supervisory  functions. Banking  supervision  has
rightly been seen as a priority in economies  that, at least in their early stages,  are dominated  bsy  banks.
While the strength  of these agencies  vary from country  to country, in general they are perceiv.d to be
the strongest  of the financial supervisory  agencies. Meanwhile  the emergence  of stock exchang,es-
the main symbol of the arrival of the market economy-has  brought with it the development  of
regulatory  agencies, several of them modeled on the SEC in the USA.  These are also of variable
quality across the ECA region. The supervision  of non-bank  financial institutions,  which have begun
to grow at a fast pace in some transition  economies,  is virtually  non-existent.
Against the background of the above developments  there is a growing concern ir mnany
transition economies  to ensure that the financial sector as a whole is subject to supervision  so that
regulatory  "gaps" do not appear. However  there is a fear that if banking  supervision  is removed  from
the Central Bank (where it typically resides in  a transition economy) to combine with  weaker
supervisory  bodies for other elements in the financial system then this will lead to some adverse
effects. The following  developments,  it is feared, might occur: the weaker elements  in the integrated
agency will "dilute" the strength  of the stronger (banking)  element; significant numbers of banking
supervisory  staff may leave the integrated  agency (to join commercial  banks where the pay is higher)
rather than take a lowering  of status, and; there could  be a dangerous  vacuum of authority arise in the
new agency  until it had established  its credibility.
Given these concerns it will be vital to  ensure that the senior management of the new
integrated  agency has strong technical and managerial credentials  with high stature in the financial
markets. Most importantly  it will be important  to undertake  the merger with great care and sensitivity
so as to retain the capacity  of the banking  supervisory  function.
Change management issues
3.4  Two  significant  change  management  issues  are likely  to  be  confronted  by  a  newly
integrated agency: dealing  with  staff dislocation issues and changing  the culture.  Falure  to
address these issues effectively  will undermine  the ability of the new  agency to  perform the
supervisory mandate it has been given.
3.5  Initial Staff  dislocation:  Typically when  several established  agencies  are merged  to
create a new  agency significant strains  arise.  Some  of these  strains can be  amelioraited by
moving staff en bloc from the old agency to the new and placing them into divisions that reflect
the structure of the former.  But there are two problems with this approach.  First, the oppc rtunity
that  integration offers is the chance to re-assess staff  and re-grade positions  leading ill some
instances to an integrated institution that is smaller than the sum of its parts (especially in the
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be missed.  Second, the direct re-establishment of the old structure in the new institution would
lead to the maintenance of former practices and cultures at a time when every effort should be
made to break down the barriers (and possibly hostilities) between what may have been rival
institutions.  There is probably little alternative in the short-run to establishing an organizational
structure structured along institutional lines.
3.6  Evidence from all of Northern Europe experience suggests that there is, in any case, a
high risk of a large attrition rate in the first year of the new agency.  This was the experience of
the Scandinavian merged agencies as well as the UK FSA where a first year turnover rate of 13%
was registered (some staff did not want to extend their commute times to the relatively remote
location of  Canary Wharf).  Staff retention can be  improved by  ensuring that  remuneration
packages  are  competitive and  at  least  as  good  as  in  the  previous  agencies.  Some  of  the
Scandinavian agencies reported  particular  difficulties with  retaining trained  accountants  and
actuaries, but this is probably a more deep-rooted problem of retention.  Pay scales should be
structured so as to give the latitude to pay relatively high salaries to certain categories of staff.
3.7  There is also a potential personnel minefield at the management level in a new agency.
At  the highest level  there  is a  question  of who  should lead the  new agency.  Specifically,
which-if  any-agency  should provide the new agency head?  The numbers of middle managers
and their agency or origin can also be an emotive subject and has been an issue in the UK FSA.
The issue of equitable treatment of the constituent agencies in this regard is typically a matter of
concern to the staff and management.
3.8  All of the factors noted above point to  a need for a strong human resource (personnel)
function being established  at the  outset to  sensitively  manage this  and  other aspects  of the
transition.
3.9  Cultural change 7. Invariably different institutions will have developed different cultures
over the years of their existence. The culture of an agency can be conditioned by such factors as:
the general approach to the supervision of entities under their wing; the terms and conditions of
work; the nature of perks; working hours; the size and nature of office accommodation, and; the
style of management.  With regards to  differences  in approach to  supervision,  one UK FSA
official--seeking  to  emphasize  the  sharp  differences  in  supervisory  culture--described  the
differences in banking and securities supervision as being a "doctor versus a policeman".  The
doctor being the remedial  approach adopted  in the  supervision  of  banks and  the  policeman
referring to the strong remedies applied by securities regulators in dealing with infringements.
Also banking supervisors and securities regulators tend to place some emphasis on intrusive on-
site  examinations while  insurance supervisors have  been typically  used  to  working  off-site.
When  different cultures  are  merged  in  a  single  agency it  can  create  significant adjustment
problems.  This is confirmed by experience in all of the Northern European integrated agencies.
3.10  Some  of the Northern  European  agencies engaged  specialist consulting companies  to
assist in solving these sorts of problems.  The results were mixed however.  One view expressed
7  Readers  interested  in issues  of change  management  in integrated  agencies  should  refer  also to the more  generic
literature  on mergers  and change  management.
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more effective impact.
3.11  As  noted  above,  cultural  differences  could  persist  in  a  situation  where  the  original
agencies are transplanted into the new agency to create silos of staff that are still segregated.  In
practice, this might be the only realistic short-tern  option in most instances.  If this is the case,
however, immediate actions must be taken to break down the cultural divide.  Working groups
should be set up, comprising members of each of the original agencies, that should be charged
with the task of developing a program for breaking down the cultural barriers.  This has proved
relatively effective in the UK FSA context.  On balance, the quicker that a new agency is able to
mix staff across the old boundaries, the better.
3.12  The sort of techniques that can be applied includes the structuring of cross-cultural teams
and the holding of teambuilding retreats.  Communications to staff should be open and frequent.
Over time (and as noted earlier in the paper) there should be more radical experimentation with
different organizational forms that cut across cultures and emphasize functional rather than the
earlier institutional breakclowns of staff.  In the UK FSA the complex groups organizational unit
can also be construed as an attempt to bridge the different cultures by bringing to bear staff with
different skills and backgrounds to the supervision of a financial conglomerate.  Parenthetically it
should be noted that the complex groups formulation has led to its own problems, not least the
fact that  staff  not working  on  complex  groups may have, to  some  extent,  felt  second  class
citizens.  That said, however, the UK FSA has worked hard to break down the barriers between
different categories of staif, not least by the strong symbolism of establishing a completely open
plan office, even for the most senior of management.
3.13  Over and above th,e modalities noted above for bringing the staff together, a conscious
policy of rotating staff-to  the extent that sunk skills are transferable to other tasks-can  help
lower barriers. In the longer run the influx of new staff and the turnover of older staff wil  l renew
the institution and completely break down the old cultures.
24IV.  IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPING AND TRANSITION COUNTRIES
4.1  Deciding on an integrated model:  The foregoing review of the northern European
experience  of integrated  supervision  suggests  that there are two main operative  reasons  for these
countries  having  adopted  this organizational  form of regulation. The first is the desire  to achieve
economies  of scale in regulation,  an argument  that is especially  strong in the comparatively  small
countries  of Norway, Denmark  and Sweden. The second  main reason is a desire to respond to
the formation  of financial  conglomerates.  In the Scandinavian  countries  these primarily  took the
form of bancassurance  groups;  banking  and securities  markets activities  had already been closely
integrated for a number of years.  In the UK the rationale was based more on the growing
integration  of banking  and securities  activities,  with the development  of bancassurance  playing  a
subsidiary  (albeit still  significant)  role. However,  in all these cases  there was a perceived  need to
bring greater  clarity and consistency  to the regulation  of complex  financial  groups. In short, the
need  for integrated  supervision  tends  to reflect  the underlying  integration  of financial  markets.
4.2  These  arguments for  integrated regulation do  not  automatically imply  that  this
organizational  form would  be appropriate  for transition  economies  or the emerging  markets. It is
important  that the organizational  form of regulation  be adapted  to the circumstances  of particular
countries. Of especial  importance  is ensuring  that the structure  of regulation  is adapted to the
underlying  structure  of financial  markets. For example,  there might be little point in integrating
supervision  if credit,  securities,  and insurance  markets  remain largely  distinct.
4.3  The purpose of the decision-tree  (set out below) is to assist in the process of choice of
organizational  model. It begins with the "small country  argument"  since, as our examination  of
the northern European experience has indicated, this would seem to represent the strongest
justification for creating an IFSSA.  Indeed, the "small country" rationale is something of a
misnomer. It might more accurately  be termed the "small financial  system"  rationale. As such,
it applies to many transition  and developing  countries  since, although  they may be much larger
than the Scandinavian  countries  in terms of population,  their financial  systems  are approximately
of the same  size or smaller  when measured  by assets or capital.
4.4  Thus the "small  country [financial  system]  rationale"  would also seem to apply in many
transition and developing economies.  One reason simply is that their human resources in
regulation  will inevitably  always  be thinly spread. But in many of these countries  this problem is
compounded  by the fact that they are still in the process of building up their human capital. As
already noted, one of the clear benefits derived from the Scandinavian  experience was that
integrated  supervision  has permitted  the formation  of a stronger  cadre of regulatory  professionals
than otherwise  would  have been  the case. Where  regulatory  resources  are scarce, and a cadre of
regulatory  professionals  is being developed,  the argument that all the relevant human capital
should  be concentrated  in a single  organization  becomes  particularly  strong.
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agency with close administrative  links to central  financial sector supervisore  agency.
bank (following  the Finnish model).
264.5  Another aspect of the "small country rationale" - the desire to achieve economies of scale
- may also be relevant in the transition and developing economies.  One undoubted advantage of
the integrated approach is that it permits the centralization of support and infrastructure services
like recruitment, training, administration and IT.  To the extent that this can result in cost savings
in  an  environment  where  regulatory  activities  may  be  severely  constrained  by  budgetary
considerations, the benefits should not be underestimated.  On the other hand, it should also be
noted that there are other possible approaches to  obtaining the same economies of  scale.  As
noted above, the Finnish approach offers an alternative to that of the IFSSAs adopted in the other
Scandinavian countries.
4.6  If the small country rationale does not evidently apply, the second stage of the decision
tree is to consider the degree of concentration in the financial services sector.  The Scandinavian
financial  services sectors  are highly  concentrated,  with  comparatively  few  financial  groups
accounting for the preponderance of financial sector assets 8, and there is little doubt that this has
been an important contributory factor in the decision to establish a IFSSA.  It was argued by
some  of our  interlocutors that  a highly  concentrated  financial  sector points  to  the need  for
regulation to be integrated to provide a sufficiently strong counterweight to the economic power
these  groups might potentially  exercise.  A similar  argument  may also  have  influenced the
thinking of the UK government in deciding to establish the FSA.  Similarly, an argument for
integrated supervision in transition or developing economies is that their financial systems also
tend to be dominated by relatively few large financial institutions.  A typical feature of many
transition economies is a highly polarized financial system with a large share of their deposit and
loan markets being accounted for by relatively few institutions.  These institutions are not only
able to exercise significant economic power but they often wield significant political influence as
well.  They are often state-owned or recently privatized, and in  any case their links with the
governmental machinery remain  strong.  In  such an environment there  is a  clear  case for a
strong, centralized regulatory  agency to  act  as a  counterweight to  the  power  and  influence
exercised by these groups.
4.7  The  third  step  in  the  decision  tree  is  to  consider  the  financial  conglomeratization
argument.  Financial conglomerates in the sense that they exist in the industrialized countries of
Northern Europe are relatively rare in the developing and transition economies, and hence this
argument would seem to be less important than it was for the Scandinavian countries or the UK.
Transition and developing market financial systems remain bank dominated, with comparatively
little  role  at  present  for  either  securities  markets  or  non-bank  financial  intermediaries  like
insurance companies  or pension  or mutual  funds.  Hence  diversified financial  conglomerate
groups  which  combine  banking,  securities  and  insurance  business  in  approximately  equal
measures tend not to exist in these countries. None the less, the dominance of banks within these
economies  mean that  they  tend to  be  the  most  active participants  in  all  forms  of  financial
intermediation.  To  the  extent  that  securities  or  insurance  markets  do  exist,  the  primary
institutions operating in them are usually banks offering a full range of financial services.  This
gives rise to a variation on the financial conglomeratization justification for the creation of an
IFSSA.  Given that  banks are the central institutions  in the financial  system, with  non-bank
financial intermediaries relegated to a largely peripheral role, the case for integrated supervision
8  For example,  in Sweden  in 1995  13 commercial  banks  accounted  for 92% of the deposit  market  and 32% of the
loan  market; in Finland,  seven  institutions  accounted  for 64%  and 70% of these  markets  respectively.
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regulates banks also to regulate other types of financial intermediary and activity.  This will help
ensure that all of a bank's  activities are subject to consolidated supervision by a regulator that is
not inhibited from overseeing them by a lack of appropriate powers.
4.8  The next step in the decision tree is to consider the argument ,that integrated supervision
is  better  adapted  to  financial  sectors  that  are  undergoing  a  process  of  rapid  change  and
innovation,  for  example  as  a  result  of  recent  financial  liberalization.  The  experience  of
integrated supervision in Northern Europe suggests that this factor may be particularly relevant
to the  transition  and  developing  economies.  Integrated  supervision  makes  it  comparatively
difficult for potential problems to disappear through the gaps between regulatory jurisdictions.
The financial sectors  of transition  and  developing  countries  can undergo  a  process  of  rapid
transformation, especially in the immediate aftermath of liberalization.  The emergence of new
types  of financial intermediaries and new  types  of financial product may leave  conventional
regulatory  structures struggling to  keep pace.  An instance  is  the emergence  of finance  and
leasing companies, which can be the source of significant credit expansion in their ovn  right.
Excessive expansion by these companies was at the root of the Secondary Banking Crisis in the
UK during 1973-74 and the Scandinavian banking crises of the early 1990s.  Hence monitoring
the activities of these companies matters from the point of view of macroprudential policy.
4.9  An integrated  supervisory  agency might  be  better  placed  than  specialist  agencies  to
monitor the activities of such companies, simply because it does not  suffer from the kinds of
boundary disputes which can plague a  series of specialist regulators.  Hence one  of the most
important factors to be considered in establishing an integrated supervisory authority is whether
or not the financial sector is, or is likely to be, undergoing a process of rapid mutation in 'which
conventional  lines  of  demarcation  may  become  a  hindrance.  In  this  event,  an  integrated
supervisory  agency  would  seem to  offer  significant  advantages  over  a  series  of  specialist
agencies.
4.10  If one or more of these factors points towards the creation of a IFSSA, then the c ecision
tree requires a number of more specific factors to be considered.  Of particular importance is the
question  of  whether  or  not  the  central  bank  currently  conducts  banking  supervisiorn.  The
formation of an integrated regulatory agency necessitates consideration of the crisis management
arrangements that will be put in place.  As already discussed, the Scandinavian experierce  was
exceptional in that banking supervision had never been a central bank function in these cc mtries.
This meant that there has been comparatively little consideration of the implications for crisis
management of the formration of an integrated agency.  By contrast, in Britain, the F' A. was
formed in part by the banking supervision division of the Bank of England.  These circum stances
resulted in a more formalized approach to the arrangements for crisis management than hl .d been
the  case  in  Scandinavia.  For  many  of  the transition  and  emerging  market  econornies  the
formation of an integrated regulatory body would similarly require the central bank to su:render
some of its existing functions.  In these circumstances, a more formalized approach  to crisis
management, based on the UK's arrangements, might be appropriate.
4.11  Also important is the question of whether or not the central bank has strong guaranitees  of
its independence.  If it does, then removing banking supervision from its functions may have a
28detrimental effect on the independence and quality of the banking supervisory function (as noted
in  Box  3.1).  This  problem may be  especially pronounced  in the  developing  and transition
economies where guarantees of agency independence from political  interference can often be
difficult to establish.  In this case, consideration should be given to establishing the IFSSA as an
autonomous agency with administrative links to the central bank, on the Finnish model.  This
model may have much to offer the developing and transition economies, given the role of the
central bank in relation to the Finnish supervisory authority.  Since central banks tend to be
relatively autonomous of the rest of the governmental machinery, permitting them a major role in
the budgetary, policy  and  appointments process  for regulatory  agencies  might be  a  way  of
insulating the latter from the political process.  However, the proposed structure would differ
from  the  Finnish model  in that  all three  sectors  of the  industry  - banking,  securities,  and
insurance - would  be  regulated by  the  integrated  supervisory agency.  On the  other hand,
balanced against this argument is the consideration that such an arrangement might implicitly be
seen as extending the central bank guarantee of support across the whole financial sector with the
associated consequences for moral hazard.  Any institutional design on this basis must ensure
that the relationship between the central bank and IFSSA is sufficiently arms-length to ensure
that this perception does not develop.
4.12  If  the  IFSSA  is  not  associated  with  the  central  bank,  other  mechanisms  must  be
considered to ensure its independence.  One aspect of the Scandinavian experience that it would
be  difficult  to  transplant  into  a  transition  or  emerging  country  environment  concerns  the
governance  arrangements for  their  regulatory  agencies.  As  noted  above,  the  Scandinavian
countries place  substantial  emphasis on the transparency  of  decision-making as  the primary
mechanism to ensure both the independence and accountability of their regulatory agencies.  But
this  approach  is  premised  on  the  existence of  a  political  culture  that  prizes  openness  and
transparency and in which decision-makers recognize the legitimacy of public scrutiny of their
decisions.  In  many transition  and emerging  countries these preconditions  are absent.  This
means  that  the  governance  mechanisms  of  their  regulatory  bodies  need  more  careful
consideration than has been given in some of the Scandinavian countries to date.  This problem
applies whatever the nature of the regulatory structure adopted, but it is arguably compounded by
the decision to form an integrated supervisory agency.  It could be argued that politicians or
vested interests would more easily capture a single supervisory body than they could a more
diverse regulatory system based on specialist agencies.  Put somewhat crudely, a single Director
General  might be  more  easily  suborned than  would three.  In  the  absence  of  central bank
involvement, it will be necessary for the governance provisions of a single regulatory agency to
cover  such  matters  as  the  terms  of  appointment  for  the  Director  General  and  other  board
members;  their  term  of  office  and  conditions  of  dismissal;  and  ideally  the  role  of  two
independent authorities  (e.g. Finance  Minister and  parliament)  in  determining  appointments.
There should also be clear public criteria, stated in advance, according to which appointments
should be capable of being justified.
4.13  Internal  structure:  Finally,  although  not  formally  part  of  the  decision  tree  itself,
consideration must  also  be  given to  the internal  structure of  the IFSSA.  It  should also  be
apparent from the earlier discussion that there is no one right model for the internal organization
of an integrated regulatory authority.  Least difficult to implement is a structure which continues
to  preserve the  distinction  between  banking,  securities and  insurance  regulation  as  separate
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well adapted to dealing with financial conglomerates, although this is less likely to be a problem
in the developing and transition economies for reasons already discussed.  More problematic is
the tendency to preserve existing institutional  cultures, thus  inhibiting the agency's  ebility to
function as a single integrated entity.  As already stressed at a number of points in th.is paper,
there  is  a  premium  on high  quality  management  who  can  make  an  integrated  supe:rwisory
authority a reality.  The decision to integrate is only the beginning of a long and difficult process
(as noted in Section III).
30V.  CONCLUSIONS
5.1  Northern European experience has been able to shed some light on the three questions
posed  at the outset of this  paper that  were  central to  the debate  on integration  of  financial
regulation in transition and developing economies.
Under what conditions should, or should not a country consider moving to an integrated
model offinancial  supervision?
*  There is little  doubt that  for  a  small transition  or  developing country-or  indeed  an
economy with a small financial sector-the  economies of scale argument for establishing
an integrated agency is a strong one that outweighs the costs associated with a move to
such a model.
*  In a financial sector dominated by banks, with little role for the capital markets or  a
highly integrated financial sector, there is also a strong case for an integrated approach.
•  Countries not falling under the above two categories must weigh up the pros and cons of
moving to the integrated model in the context of their own institutional settings.
How should an integrated agency be structured,  organized and managed?
,  There  is  no  one  obviously  correct  organizational  structure  for  integrated  regulatory
agencies.  Existing agencies are still experimenting with a variety of forms in an attempt
to realize the synergies which integrated supervision should theoretically generate.
*  An  institutionally-based  structure  has  the  virtue  of  simplicity  and  can  be  relatively
quickly implemented.  However, it tends to preserve the cultures and  identities of the
predecessor agencies to a greater extent than is optimal.
*  Realizing the benefits of integrated supervision requires active management, both during
the  change process  itself and  subsequently to  build a  distinctive agency  identity and
culture.
How should the integration process itself be managed?
*  Making the decision to move to an integrated agency is just the beginning of the process.
The more difficult part is implementation itself.  This should be carefully and sensitively
managed.
*  Northern  European  experience  suggests  that  once  the  decision  has  been  made  to
integrate, the implementation phase should be made as short as possible.
31*  Once the merger is completed a well conceived "change management" process should be
put  in  place  aimed  at  overcoming  the  cultural  barriers  associated  with  the  previous
fragmented structure.
5.2  The review of Northern European experience has inevitably raised a number of additional
questions for future work in this field.  Specifically:
*  Additional work on the legal framework for integrated agencies including possibly
the development of a model law governing integrated agencies for small countries or
those with srnall financial systems
*  A more extensive cataloguing of experience in the implementation of the integrated
model drawing on a wider set of countries outside Northern Europe
*  More detailed consideration of the types  of  governance and  funding  arrangements
which  might be  appropriate for  integrated  agencies  in  a  specifically  transition  or
developing country context
*  Further  consideration  of  the  most  appropriate  relationship  between  an  integrated
agency  and  the  central  bank,  especially  with  regard  to  crisis  management
arrangements
*  Future  reviews  of  the  progress  being  made  by  existing  integrated  agencies  in
addressing scme of the outstanding managerial and organizational issues, especially
focussing on the extent to which their approaches may be of more general application
5.3  Integrated financial  services supervisory  authorities  would  appear to  be  an  at:ractive
option for many  small countries  or  countries  with  small,  rapidly  evolving  financial  sectors.
However, it is clear thal. the decision on whether or not to integrate should be taken  after full
consideration of the circumstances of each individual country.  As with any policy opti  Mn, there
are disadvantages as well as advantages to the IFSSA approach.  If, on balance, the acvantages
outweigh the disadvantages for a particular country then the change management proi,ess will
become especially important.  Only with  a strong, active change management process c(an  the
undoubted benefits of an IFSSA be realized.
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